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LOWBROWS, HIGHBROWS, AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
BY ELBRIDGE COLBY
THE Other day a friend argued very strenuously with me
against the plea for national defense, which is always ad-
vanced whenever a question is raised concerning the mainte-
nance of an army and a navy. He said that this country is not
in danger of attack and never has been in danger. He pointed out
that the American colonists were really responsible for the Revo-
lution because they resisted governmental methods employed by
British representatives. Resisted them by accumulating arms.
Started the war by firing upon "red coats" on a little march just
outside of Boston and made the war a serious issue by indicting
a king and declaring the colonial independence. We prosecuted
what has been called a limited war against France in 1798-1800
by authorizing naval attacks upon her commerce. We resented
British interference with our own commerce, ships, and sailors
;
and declared war against that country in 1812. We got involved
in a boundary dispute with Mexico and moved our troops to the
frontier line which we claimed, and then when our armed advance
was resisted, we solemnly announced that a state of war existed
by an Act of Mexico itself. In 1861 when certain states attempted
to withdraw from the federal union, the North was not defending
itself, but was really combining to subdue the South. In 1898
after our ultimatum to Spain had finally been accepted, we
decreed a blockade, and voted our army and navy to support
Cuban freedom. Our action was accepted by Spain as a declara-
tion of war which Congress was compelled to antedate four days.
Our real purpose in going to war with Spain was to put an end
to the intolerable disturbances in that Caribbean Island which,
continuing for years almost within sight of our shores, had be-
come a menace to our peace and tranquility. In 1917 it was we
and not Germany who declared war. All of these things, he said
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—arguing that our pleas for self-defense are contrary to the facts
of history.
It is interesting that such a plea as ours for National Defense
should be so subject to attack on historical grounds. Yet it
seems necessary to resort to a simple plea in order to reach the
average mind of the average citizen. The normal man is best
appealed to on his selfish side. To counteract the pacifist propa-
ganda as to costs of military establishments and the monetary
value of tax rate reductions, the defense advocate has to speak
of protecting our shores from invasion and hostile occupation.
Everyone understands self-defense. It is understood generally
to be a sufficient excuse for homicide. It underlies the constitu-
tional provision w^hich prohibits search and seizure of a man's
property v^ithout a legal warrant. We all have a strong sense
of possession and like to retain what is ours. The "defense of
hearth and home" is valid logic in the common minds of common
men. Yet there is a sounder line of thought for more intellectual
men.
The theory of national defense is combined closely with the
whole principle of modern government. Even the liberal, social-
istically inclined Ramsay MacDonald celebrates his initiation as
Britisn Premier by securing additional aircraft and cruiser appro-
priations from the British Parliament. A responsible statesman
sees to the support of his government.
International law3^ers are among the few people in the world
acquainted with international affairs and with means of inter-
national communication and cooperation. They would naturally
—one would think—be most likely to be interested in world-wide
organizations. Yet those very international lawyers commenced
their studies by scrutinizing the principles of national
sovereignty, national independence, and national rights. Indeed,
it is not too much to say that most of our distinguished inter-
national lawyers are among the most ardent nationalists we have
in this country. One authority says the right of self-preservation
is the first law of nations. Another authority says this right is
the first of absolute and permanent rights, and serves as a fun-
damental basis for a great number of accessory, secondary or
occasional rights. An essential condition for the continuance of
wars, and therefore the continuance of the doctrine of national
defense, is the doctrine of separate sovereignty. Israel Zangwill
was perfectly correct when he said that the way to abolish war
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was to do away with all frontier lines, custom houses, restrictions
on immigration, and separate national sovereignties. So long as
separate sovereign states continue owing no duties to higher organ-
izations and insistently maintain their rights—so long as interna-
tional law, not only permits, but actually emphasizes this con-
dition—there will ahvays be questions at issue between nations
that are not justiciable. Arbitration treaties may be drawn.
Arbitration courts may be established. Yet the arbitration treat-
ies always exempt from their scope questions affecting national
rights, policies, interests and honor. Arbitration courts have no
compulsory jurisdiction and are without power to enforce their
decrees. For some things the ultimate arbitrament is that of
war. It is not by chance that the statuesque figure of justice
bears a sword.
Almost one hundred years ago, when the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court handed down a decision nullifying the course of
action taken by the State of Georgia against the Indian nation
of the Cherokees, the gentleman then in the presidential chair
remarked, "Johi^ Marshall has made his decision—now let him
enforce it !" Georgia scoffed at the opinion of the Supreme Court.
The mandate was never obeyed. The power to enforce the juris-
diction of the court did not operate. So long as there is no such
power, or so long as such existing power does not operate, the
courts are useless. But when there is such a power and it does
operate, their opinions are the guides to policy. The armed power
merely enforces the policy. Without the power, the policy is
impotent.
From 1861 to 1865 the United States needed armed forces to
suppress a rebellion. The doctrine of state sovereignty without
our imion had been a series of trouble ever since it was discussed
in the Constitutional Convention of 1787. Intensified from year
to year by the slavery question a conflict of ideas became a con-
flict of laws. The conflict of laws became a conflict of peoples
until horizontal lines across the continent could have divided the
respective forces. The conflict of the two peooles finally became
a conflict of rifle and cannon. The conflict ceased to be an argu-
ment in constitutional law and became on the one hand a denial
and on the other hand a support of the law of the land itself.
From 1861 to 1865, as General Sherman later said, the Supreme
Court was paralyzed. Its rights and decreees were treated with
contempt south of the Potomac and the Ohio. It could not sum-
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men a witness or send a deputy marshal. Armed force was needed
to restore the law. Right needed the aid of might.
In one sense this Civil War of ours was a defensive war. It
was a war to support the Federal Union. In a military sense it
was an offensive war, waged to subdue a revolution as McClellan
said, "to crush a population." And here with this single conflict
as an example we can see a clear distinction between defense of
national policies and defense of a nation. To some simple-minded
people national defense may mean the protection of hearth and
home against an invader. To others, capable of thinking deeply,
clearly, and broadly, it may mean the defense of our policies, of
our government, of our citizens against annoyance, injustice and
insidt. .So long as our national policies are defensive and not
offensive, the war we wage in support of these policies will be a
defensive war. Avhatever may l)e the character of the military
operations. According to this distinction the American Revolu-
tion was a defensive war to maintain chartered rights and tradi-
tional liberties. In this sense, the War with France of 1798-1800.
the \Ysir of 1812. and the A\'ar of 1917. were defensive wars to
preserve our prestige and jn'otcct our people engaged in com-
merce overseas.
Defensives and offensives cannot be definitely determined as
such on any circumstantial or contemporary grounds. We must
go back to the causes and the antecedents, else our interpretations
arc merely su])crficial and for the occasion and the instance alone.
When Lee invaded the North and struck, on two separate cam-
paigns, towards Antietam and Gettysburg, he was tactically on
the offensive, but strategically on the defensive. He invaded
only to relieve pressure from the Richmond front. For the Con-
federacy, as I have said, the war was a defensive war, in defense
of State sovereignties against the attempts of the North to com-
pel adherence to the Union.
When British forces occupied the town of Castine. Maine, in
1814, our local inhabitants were on the defensive; the British
were the invaders. If we look back far enough, we might say
that the American Congress was the real offender, for it had
declared war. And yet. if Ave investigate fully, we find that our
declaration of war was really a defensive act, it was the last resort
of a oconle whose principles of nationality had been continuously
assailed by Britain. It was our only remaining means of argui'ig
our point in diplomatic discussion. The war of 1812 was a defens-
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ive war, in spite of our initiating the hostilities by declaring it
formally, in spite of our attempts to invade Canada from Detroit
and from Niagara. The very invalidity of purely military opera-
tions as a single criterion is admirably illustrated by that same
conflict. The British invaded our territories at Plattsburg, Wash-
ington, Castine, and New Orleans. We invaded the British ter-
ritory twice, at opposite ends of Lake Eric. The crossing of a
frontier line is no standard of judgment for the determination of
the offensive or defensive character of a war.
Suppose, for instance, that we should enter a war witii a
strong foreign nation. In a military sense, we should have to
assume an initial defensive. With a population of over a hundred
millions and a potential military manpower of over sixteen mil-
lion, we would still be unready to act aggressively with our
forces. With altogether only 500,000 trained citizens—about half
of whom are ofificer material—and with a regular army of only
130,000 we would have to adopt a defensive position in readiness
and protect our shores until we could assemble and train our
personnel. This in a military sense. Yet the military situation
is not the wdiole of it. We must go behind the military opera-
tions and discover what make them necessary in the first place.
If the war Ave entered was brought on because w^e had conducted
a political offensive in foreign aft'airs. it would be an offensive
war. If it was brought on to maintain just and rightful defensive
foreign policies, it ould be a defensive w^ar, whatever the charac-
ter of the operations.
People wdio read history and arc accustomed to thinking in
historical terms are slow to analyze current conditions. Conse-
quently, for a long time it was thought that wars w^ere the sport
of kings. It was believed that they were essentially political in
their causes. It was believed that increasing international com-
munication and trade would tend to diminish international politi-
cal differences. It was really not until the twentieth century that
people began to understand that wars are principally economic
in their causes. Prior to the World War, Mr. Brailsford's book,
entitled. IVar of Steel and Gold, made the economic motixe clear.
Then Mr. Lippman told the people of this country how to recog-
nize "The Stakes of Diplomacy" in European affairs. He pointetl
out, as a single example, that the financial interests of the Bank
of Rome in a north African power-house, actually brought on the
Italian-Turkish war which was portrayed in ]iopular terms as a
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contest between the traditions of ancient Rome and of the oriental
race, between Christ and Mohammed, Since then Lionel Curtis,
Mr. Bakeless, Mr. Lowes Dickinson, and Admiral Niblack have
insisted that all wars are economic in their motives. We have
come to recognize that the protection of citizens, traders and
interests beyond our borders are the real causes of war. Speak-
ing in New York in 1923, Secretary Hughes said that we did not
like to relinquish our rights under the capitulations agreement,
but that we could not go to war to protect the legal status of our
citizens in Turkey. When nationalistic Turkey was concentrat-
ing towards the Dardanelles, evangelistic organizations who had
previously pleaded for peace, promptly faced about and demanded
armed forces to suppress the Turk. President Coolidge more
recently said in New York, "We are seeking no acquisition of
territory and maintaining no military establishment wuth un-
friendly hostile intent. We have come to a position of great
power and great responsibility. Our first duty is to ourselves.
American standards must be maintained. American institutions
must be preserved. The freedom of the people, politically, eco-
nomically, intellectually, morally and spiritually must continue
to be advanced. The world knows that we do not seek to rule
by force of arms, our strength lies in our moral power. We main-
tain a military force for our defense, but our offensive lies in the
justice of our cause."
War may sometimes be necessary, but it will be a war to
enforce a policy and not a war conducted for the pur])ose of
slaughter. Our troops may actually take the ofifensive, but so
long as our diplomatic policy is defensive, it will be a defensive
war. The army and the navy are not war-makers. When states-
men and people decide on war as a means to accomplish the
national will, they call upon the army and the navy to uphold
our policies against our opponents. In protecting our policies,
we protect our nation.
National defense is not a thing in itself. Armies and navies
are not maintained to bring on wars. The present excessive
armament of France in the air will not cause a war with Eng-
land, because the policies of those two countries are not bitterly
in opposition, but merely divergent. There may be differences
and conflicts of opinion, but so long as there is no direct antagon-
ism, there can be no war. Armies and navies are but the instru-
ments of statecraft, the last type of ultimata, where bayonets and
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bullets serve as punctuation marks, and the professional decencies
of campaigners take the place of the elaborate protocol and cour-
tesies of polished diplomats. National defense is a mode of
national action. The nation is the unit of action. Its policy is
the cause of war. Military operations are merely the means by
which the national will is imposed upon those who condemn or
oppose it. Protection at our seaports may be efifected by immi-
gration restriction, or by actual exclusion laws. Protection of
the Mexican frontier against marauding bandits, has to be
effected by troops who patrol the desolate banks of the Rio
Grande. If the rum runner invades our territorial waters, he is
met by a coast guard cutter—which is armed. If many rum run-
ners combine to destroy the armed ships which deny them pas-
sage across, or anchorage along, the marginal sea, the open revolt
may be put down by the navy. If the foreign country whose flag
the rum fleet flies, presses the issue, naval engagements may
bring about a naval war or even a general war. When national
policy declares that war actually exists between this country or
another, protection becomes a matter needing broader and most
intensive eft"orts. The popular spirit supports the national policy.
The defense of policies, when \var is flagrant, becomes in fact a
defense of national territory.
Several years of agitation and counter-agitation have finally
resulted in the pacifist organizations adopting their logical posi-
tion. They are now frankly coming out and taking the so-called
"slacker's oath" refusing to support their government in any war
measures for any cause, thus definitely denying one of the pri-
mary obligations of citizenship. There are some of them even
saying that immigration restrictions and exclusions should go by
the board. The issue is not war or peace. The issue is definitely
one of national allegiance and nationality. And, strange as it
may seem, this very slacker's oath was supported by certain
young student volunteers interested in foreign missionary serv-
ice, who when they go abroad will be protected in China per-
haps by the long arm and the strong policy of their own govern-
ment. In China itself they will learn that a nation without organ-
ization of its national power is able neither to maintain peace and
tranquility within its own borders nor to preserve those borders
against the incursions of foreign peoples. In potential manpower,
the United States is noted on statistical charts as the equal of
China. In actual power, the United States is superior because of
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our superior facilities for organization and our superior arma-
ment. China has betrayed her nationality. Shall we betray ours?
China has a weak foreign policy. Shall ours be equally weak?
China is over-run with foreigners and her aggravated people are
restricted from entering many of the states of the world. Shall
we likewise be over-run with foreigners, proselyted by missioners
and restricted from travel and settlement overseas? The answer
lies in the strength or weakness of our desire to maintain our
nationality and in our willingness to support and defend the
national policies of the United States. It is a problem of loyalty
and the national will of a self-governing people.
